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Abstract
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are the most common and easiest attacks to propagate over internet.
It causes a high degree of destruction to the network and systems resources. The destructive nature of DDoS attacks
force security engineers to design defense solutions which can detect and take counter actions to defend against such
attacks. In this paper, we investigated the packet ﬂood attacks and presented a collaborative peer to peer defense mech-
anism. The proposed solution detects the attack at victim edge router and sends the alert messages to its neighboring
nodes which allow them to proactively defend themselves. Simulation results shows the eﬃciency of the solution with
less false positives at victim edge router and less damage to the network due to proactive defense approach .
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1. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is relatively simple but powerful technique to consume network and
system resources. Most of these attacks are propagated in the network to halt the ﬂow of network traﬃc or crash the
system recourses. During the attack time, the victims experience a less eﬃcient sharing of resources or completely
disrupted. Large volume of legitimate & illegitimate packets and IP spooﬁng attacks are most destructive attacks that
hinder defense solutions to protect network against such attacks. Attackers usually relay on trojan horse programs or
zombie machines present in diﬀerent networks to propagate packet ﬂood attacks towards particular victim machine
or network. In this situation defense solutions becomes ineﬀective as they could not accurately detect attacks and
diﬀerentiate between legitimate and illegitimate packets.
Our research studies [1] showed that in internet environment, we can deploy defense solutions on three locations; ﬁrst
near source node, second at backbone node and third at victim node (these node could be network or machines). Here
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each location has its own advantages and disadvantages of solution deployment. Attack detection near the source node
can reduce the collateral damage but very distributed nature of attack make it harder for defense solution to detect
attack traﬃc and may result in high false positive. Deploying defense solution at backbone has a tradeoﬀ between
eﬃciency and treat to the core network. Third location is victim machine or network, which is the ultimate goal of
DDoS attacks for destruction. At this location, we have enough information that can be useful to diﬀerentiate between
legitimate and illegitimate packets with less false/positive. Following we outlined some requirements for eﬀective
DDoS defense solution.
• Distributed Defense Solution: If we deploy defense solution at each available defense location and force all the
nodes to work collectively than it will be diﬃcult to launch a successful attack.
• Intelligent Traﬃc Management: Routers must deploy intelligent traﬃc management scheme, so that if there is
congestions at any router than it propagate traﬃc load alerts to other routers. In this way, legitimate traﬃc can
easily be retrieved at destination end.
• Detailed Attack Information: In the absence of any information about actual attacking mechanisms, it is very
diﬃcult for security solution engineers to make a cure. Attack information must include the attack type, IP
packet Size, TTL Value, IP packet header length, server port number, attempted response, eﬀectiveness and
damages occurred by the attack
• Large Scale Evaluation: DDoS defense requires, large scale real time testing environment across the internet
that can support thousands of nodes. Usually internet security vulnerability solution provides claim about the
performance of their defense solutions on the bases of small scale performance evaluation
• Support Incremental Deployment: The solution can show best results only if it works in collaborative manner
and most of networks on the internet adopt this feature. Increase in number of secure routers will show better
defense against DDoS attacks.
Above stated requirements and our observation leads us to the conclusion that, instead of designing centralize defense
systems, it is important to design distributed detection and defense system, where heterogeneous nodes can collabo-
rate over the network and monitor traﬃc in cooperative manner. In this paper, we have investigated the packet ﬂood
attacks and proposed a collaborative peer to peer defense mechanism, where heterogeneous defence nodes are placed
in the network to monitor traﬃc in cooperative manner with other nodes. The proposed solution detects the attack
at victim edge router and sends the alert messages to its neighboring nodes which allow them to proactively defend
themselves before it can aﬀect the whole network. The cooperation between each detecting node is done with reliable
communication mechanism. We aim that, deployment of our framework over internet will provide reliable and col-
laborative detection & defense, and can improve the eﬃciency of detection with the addition of detecting nodes in the
network.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed: In section 2 we review state of art, section 3 present our proposed
mechanism, section 4 present the results and ﬁnally we conclude the paper in section 5.
2. Related Work
This section, presents the review of some presentative works that address diﬀerent defence and detection solutions.
Source edge router has high computational power and this is the location from where the attacker launches the attack
[2]. Murkovic in [3] presented a D-Ward defense solution for DDoS at source end. D-Ward defense solution resides
at border router that detects attack and drops the attack traﬃc near source to avoid the collateral damage [3]. D-Ward
defense monitors all incoming and outgoing traﬃc and make light weighted traﬃc pattern. Any sudden change in
traﬃc pattern will be the possible indication of attack and the traﬃc is discarded from entering into network. In
another approach Gil and Poletto presented an approach to model normal traﬃc ﬂow on the bases of aggregate traﬃc
ratio and stop the attack traﬃc to ﬂow into the network [2]. Author in [4] presented a distributed packet ﬁltering
(DPF) mechanism that validates the source address of inbound packets. DPF implementation on core routers identify
the spoofed IP packet and drop illegitimate traﬃc. Pushback aggregated congestion control is an other approach where
routers assume congestion as a symptom of DDoS attack and activate rate limiting according to local policy. If the
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congested router fails to control the overﬂow problem than it issues a rate limit request to its neighbor’s intermediate
routers. Later these requests are propagated to all routers along the traﬃc path those are enabled with push back
capability [5]. COSSACK is an other solution that forms a multicast defense nodes group, which are deployed at
source and victim network. Every connected defense node detects attack and issue alert to group for further attack
prevention measurements [6].
Router based solutions trigger attack alert when they found sudden increase in the data traﬃc. Secure overlay service
is also used to combat with the DDoS attack but it is not suitable for a publicly available service e.g. web servers and
it routes traﬃc on sub optimal route on the overlay. Secondly, secure overlay service does not limit the damage from
legitimate nodes that are subverted by the attacker [3]. Collaborative defense mechanism is eﬀective solution only
when the routers act as gateway, it locally locally identify the attack by the monitoring the drastic change in traﬃc ﬂow
[4]. Abdul et al in [7] demonstrated size based scheduling (SBS) an inbuilt weakness to DDOS attacks. Even though
this research spotlight on Least Attained Service (LAS) in association to ﬁrst in ﬁrst out (FIFO) scheduling in routers,
authors emphasize that all SBS method that support short ﬂows should not diverge much from the performance of
LAS under the kinds of attacks discussed. Wu et. al in [8] proposed an adaptive cyber security examining system that
incorporates a number of module hybrid techniques such as decision fusion-based IDS, correlation computation of
activity indicators, arbitrary matrix theory-based network representation of security activities, and event classiﬁcation
through network resemblance dimensions.
All the aforementioned solutions have some limitation in one way or other. It is for the reason that they considered
some factors and discounted other in their defense and detection solution.A scrutiny of all the presented work has
encouraged us to develop a comprehensive and eﬀective detection and defence solution that perform well and defend
the network resources.
3. Proposed Scheme
Each network connected to internet is working according to local policies deﬁned by its operator. Attacks can
be generated/ propagated either by central source propagation and or by back chaining propagation [6]. Due to the
distributed nature of internet, we proposed a peer-to-peer distributed alliance of defense node architecture. We focus
on the following factors while proposing the defense mechanism.
• Sudden increase in traﬃc at some node can be possible attack indicator [9].
• Although DDoS attack is originated from source but sometimes it causes the disruption in the whole commu-
nication channel. Considering distributed nature of attack it is proposed that the defense must be deployed in
such a way that between source and victim each defense node can collaborates with each other to eﬀectively
prevent the attack at any location of network.
• To work eﬃciently in peer to peer fashion each node along the traﬃc path should be aware of present network
condition so it can deploy better threat avoidance techniques. The information collaboration channel must be
secure and can have tendency to mitigate the wrong alerts [10].
• After detecting attack we ﬁlter traﬃc by deploying XOR packet marking [11] scheme. Packet encoding in IP
header identiﬁcation ﬁeld will help us to distinguish between privileged and un-privileged traﬃc
• The defense mechanism should have ability to support the incremental nodes without disturbing the general
network ﬂow.
3.0.1. Architecture Overview
Like every other defense solution, we have also analyzed the traﬃc behaviors and used attack signatures to iden-
tify the DDoS attack. Traﬃc model is distinct by the sequence of number of packets at time slots at each monitoring
point, which is modeled by the speciﬁc time slot d, window size D and metric of each slot. All incoming and outgoing
traﬃc patterns are modeled as following data vectors. Traﬃc pattern A= (a1, a2,, an). Correlation coeﬃcient will
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identify the traﬃc pattern correlation, we marked ’I’ as incoming pattern and ’O’ as outgoing represented in equation1.
r(I,O) =
1
xS inS out
x∑
y=1
(iy − I¯)(oy − O¯) (1)
The diﬀerence of traﬃc window size is represented as ampliﬁer rate represented in equation 2.
aIO =
∑N
K=1(I(k)O(k))∑N
K=1(I(k)2
(2)
Large aIO value shows the ampliﬁcation in traﬃc. When peering node detects the DDoS attack it will extract a rate
limit with following attack ﬂow identiﬁers (IP Protocol Type, Server Port Number, TTL Value, IP Packet Header
Length, IP/TCP/UDP checksums). After attack detection the system will generate alerts to all peering nodes along the
traﬃc path. Based on attack alert, routers will deploy rate limiting. Attack alert has very critical role in our proposed
scheme. A smart attacker can generate false attack alert to confuse the system and this alert will force routers to
activate rate limiting and packet ﬁltering. Alert should be propagated in secure environment because if the router is
compromised than a part legitimate traﬃc may be dropped. Proposed scheme imply rate limiting for the traﬃc which
contains attack signature. rateo(Pa)=ratei(Pa) ∗ ∂(con f idencea)
Here ∂(con f idencea) ≤ 1 is referred to be the conﬁdence level of identiﬁed attack signature. When ∂(con f idencea) =
0 than ∂(con f idencea) = 1.
For better understanding of proposed scheme, suppose Node A and B is suspected as an attack generator for node Y.
Both attacking nodes used node Z to forward traﬃc to Y. Obviously it is better to send the attack signature to Z on
priority bases rather than other peering nodes. On receiving alert message the neighbor will discard the duplicate alert
signature and forward it to its neighbor peering node. Based on the attack signatures information, each node adjust
rate limit accordingly.
3.0.2. Multiple-Alert Public-Alert Cryptography
This concept was generalized by Colin Boyd [12]. Imagine a variant of public alert cryptography with three alerts:
AMa2, AMb and AMc, distributed as shown in Table.1. Router1 can encrypt a message with AMa so that Router5, with
AMb and AMc, can decrypt it. Router2 can encrypt a message so that Router6 can read it, and Router3 can encrypt a
message so that Router4 can read it. Router4 can encrypt a message with AMa so that Router5 can read it, with AMb
so that Router6 can read it, or with both AMa and AMb so that Router3 can read it. Similarly, Router5 can encrypt a
message so that Router1, Router4 or Router6 can read it. All the possible combinations are summarized in Table.2.;
there are no other ones. Proposed cryptographic architecture can be extended on ’n’ alerts. If a given subset of the
alert is used to encrypt the message, then the other alerts are required to decrypt the message.
3.0.3. Single Router Message Scheduling
To avoid alert congestion at routers, we proposed the router message transfer scheduling 1 |Prec| fmax with fmax =
maxnj=1 f j(C j) and f j monotone for j=1 ...n, it is suﬃcient to construct an optimal sequence π : π(1),π(2),....,π(n) (π(i)
denotes the action in position i). Let N= 1,...n be the set of all events i.e. alert propagation and denoted by S ⊆ N the
set of unscheduled events alert generation p(s) =
∑
jIˆS p j To give the precise description message scheduling process,
we represent the precedent constraints by the corresponding adjacency matrix A=(ai j) where ai j=1 if and only if j is
the direct successor of i.
2AM= Alert Message
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Algorithm 1 Message Scheduling.
1: 1 |Prec| fmax
2: For i := 1 to n(i) :=
∑n
j=1 ai j
3: S := {1, ..., n}; p := ∑pj=1 p j
4: for k:=n Down to 1 Do
5: Begin
6: Find action j s with n( j)=0 and minimal
7: fi(p) − value;
8: S := S/ j;
9: n(i) := ∞;
10: π(k) := j;
11: p := p = pj
12: for i:=1 to n
13: Do
14: If ai j = 1
15: Then n(i) := n(i) − 1
16: End
3.0.4. Marking
After attack detection, we encode XOR marking in 16-bit IP header identiﬁcation ﬁeld to diﬀerentiate between
legitimate and non legitimate traﬃc. For encoding of IP address of routers we used two hash functions h1’ and ’h2’.
If router Ra decides to mark in the identiﬁcation ﬁeld of the IP packet, it marks h1(Ra) in the edge. If the packet
is previously marked than it will XOR the h2 (Ra) with the edge ﬁeld value and writes with the result of XOR in
fragmented IP header identiﬁcation ﬁeld. A  B = (A∧!B) ∨ (!A ∧ B) = (A ∨ B) ∧ (!A∨!B). In ﬁgure 1 router will use
Figure 1: XOR Marking Style.
last n-bit of IP address and apply XOR function among the current marking bit and the previous marking bit. After
XOR operation IP ﬁnger print will be embedded into identiﬁcation ﬁeld. The reason to using two independent hash
functions is to distinguish two routers. In the presence of hop count knowledge, it is impossible for an attacker to
fake an IP ﬁnger print with hop count less than its own [13]. The percentage of faked marks reaching the victim is
very less when the attack is coming from far away network, given the nature of the packet marking. The marking
scheme should be dynamically changeable to avoid sophisticated DDoS attack i.e. there is slight probability that an
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Algorithm 2 Marking Algorithm.
1: Packet Mark = n (IP Address)
2: for each packet
3: read H = hop count ﬁeld value
4: generate a marking bit decision number
5: y (1,0)∼ 0≤ y¡ 1
6: If y=0
7: P.edge← h1(Ra) ∴ P = Packet
8: Else
9: P.edge← P.edge⊕ h2 (Ra)
attacker may capture normal traﬃc and can guess the packet marking style. After changing the encoding style, send
the previous marking data along with the new marking data. At destination, router table will compare the marking
ﬁeld if it is matched with its marking ﬁeld dictionary then routing table will add the new marking ﬁeld in its dictionary
to authenticate the next stream of packets. The position of mark is determined on the bases of TTL modulo. We mark
the IP packet at the right n bit and shift the packet marking to left.
3.0.5. Eﬀects of Path Stability
If the route of internet traﬃc is changed than source’s privileged traﬃc might eﬀect and might be dropped by the
routers in the path. In this situation the source will re-authenticate itself through the new handshake. Using proposed
scheme, the routers will forward only authenticated traﬃc and unprivileged traﬃc will be dropped during the attack
phase.
4. Performance Results
To verify the eﬀectiveness of our proposed scheme we have simulated our solution in NS-2 3. Table.3. illustrate the
simulation environment and parameter used in simulation, each test is repeated ﬁve times. The important eﬀectiveness
measure is the time needed for attack detection. This time is measured from the start of attack. We detect attack at
early stages, but the defense start dropping the attack traﬃc when it accessed the predeﬁned threshold value for attack
tolerance. In learning phase each end host on the attack path sends packets to the victim. We observe our results at
diﬀerent threshold to get the optimize threshold value for our scheme. Figure2(a) & (b) shows the proposed solution
performance based on diﬀerent attack tolerance threshold. As soon the attack is detected the alerts are propagated
throughout the attack path, which decrease the false positive rate. To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of defense mechanism
to detect attack traﬃc, we measured total amount of attack traﬃc sent to the victim. This helps us to calculate that how
much traﬃc bypass through our ﬁlter and reached at victim. Ideally this value should be zero. Figure 3(a), illustrates
the performance of solution on high data ﬂood attack. Figure 3(b), shows the attack detection eﬃciency of solution
with respect to change in traﬃc rate, the results shows eﬃciency of 93% with only 7% false positive rate. Simulation
data showed that as far as the traﬃc contains our embedded marking and it does not match with attacker marking, we
will have approximately two percent false positive. It is noted that a single attack packet with a particular marking
received during the learning phase of the DDoS attack causes all packets with that marking to be dropped during the
attack phase. Finally traﬃc tradeoﬀs between detection rate and false positive rate is shown in ﬁgure 4.
3http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/
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(a) 0% Threshold (b) 25% Threshold
Figure 2: Filtering Performance
(a) High Data Flood Attack (b) With Respect to Changes in Traﬃc Rate
Figure 3: System Attack Detection
Figure 4: Detection Rate Vs False Positive Rate
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5. Conclusion
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks causes a high degree of destruction in the network and systems. Most
of these attacks are propagated in the network to halt the ﬂow of network traﬃc or crash the system recourses. Attacker
usually relay on trojan horse programs or zombie machines to ﬂoat attacks in the network. In this paper, we have
analyzed DDoS problem in two directions, ﬁrstly we studied the cause of attack and its implications, secondly design
and implementation issues of defense architectures under various scenarios. Our observation leads us to the conclusion
that, instead of designing centralize defense systems, it is important to design distributed detection and defense system
where heterogeneous nodes can collaborate over the network and monitor traﬃc in cooperative manner. This paper
presents a distributed collaborative detection and defense mechanism, where heterogeneous defence nodes can be
placed in the network to monitor traﬃc in cooperative manner with other nodes in network. The cooperation between
each detecting node is done with reliable communication mechanism. Directional information exchange mechanism
is used to improve accuracy of each individual node. We aim that, deployment of our framework over internet will
provide reliable and collaborative detection & defense, and can improve the eﬃciency of detection with the addition
of detecting nodes in the network.
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